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The public policy argument denying recovery appears to be compelling. The insured was committing a burglary when the damage
occurred. Recovery on the policy relieved the wrongdoer of financial
responsibility entirely. Despite the burglary, an insurer has no recourse against its insured because it is precluded from subrogating
against itself. 23 If recovery is permitted, are we not allowing a wrongdoer to benefit from his act?
Absent a "violation of law" clause in the policy, the fact insured was
in the course of a crime is immaterial. Premiums are paid for the sole
purpose to indemnify the insured for damages, as defined by the policy.
Once it is determined the insured's act is within the scope of the policy
it is not necessary to look further. By analogy, automobile insurance
would never be purchased if insurers retained a right of subrogation.
In allowing recovery, the court properly directed itself to the terms of
the policy finding no evil consequences. Having written the policy, the
insurance company could have protected itself by including a violation
of law clause. Courts will not take the liberty to rewrite insurance contracts, particularly when the party seeking greater protection is the
insurer.
James L. Ross
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a testator's grandchild, who was adopted
after the testator's death, was entitled to share in a testamentary disADOPTED AFTER THE DEATH OF THE TESTATOR-The

position of trust income to his daughter's children, if any, after her
death. The Court allowed this distribution where it was clearly shown
that the testator knew at the time he executed his will that his daughter
could have no children and already had adopted one, who subsequently
died.
Chambers Estate, 438 Pa. 22, 263 A.2d 746 (1970).
The testator, James B. Chambers, died on May 6, 1933, leaving a will
that created a trust, the income derived therefrom to be delivered
semi-annually to Hazel G. McGill, his daughter, during her life. At
23.
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her death, the income was to be paid to her children, if any, and for
and during their lives. The corpus of the trust consisting of fiftythousand dollars was to be paid to the James B. Chambers Memorial
Association upon the death of Hazel's children. The testator executed
his will on December 12, 1930.
Hazel G. McGill was physically incapable of bearing children and
because of this fact, she adopted a son, Paul, on December 12, 1930.
Her father, James B. Chambers, was then alive and was quite fond of
Paul, his adopted grandson. Paul McGill died in an accident in September, 1931, and the testator, James B. Chambers, died on May 6,
1933, without making any change in his will. The appellant, William
McGill, was adopted by Hazel G. McGill on October 19, 1937, almost
four and one-half years after the death of the testator. Hazel G. McGill
died on May 2, 1966, and William McGill obtained a citation from the
orphans' court requiring the trustee to show cause why the future
trust income should not be paid to him. His petition was dismissed,
and William McGill appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The James B. Chambers Memorial Association presented briefs to
the State Supreme Court in an attempt to defeat William McGill's
contention that he should take under the trust provisions of the will.1
At common law, adopted children had no rights of inheritance from
2
their adopting parents and all such rights were purely statutory.
Pennsylvania statutes now govern in any controversy arising over the
testamentary rights of adopted children in this commonwealth. The
Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947 provides that the will of any person
who died prior to January 7, 1948 is governed by the Wills Act of
1917.3 The pertinent section of the Wills Act of 1917 dealing with
adopted children provides that:
Whenever in any will a bequest or devise shall be made to the
child or children of any person other than the testator, without
naming such child or children, such bequest or devise shall be
construed to include any adopted child or children of such person
who were adopted before the date of the will, unless a contrary
intention shall appear by the will.4 (Emphasis added.)
The words "unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will"
limit the scope of the entire provision, which (without this phrase)
1.
2.
3.
4.
Wills

Chambers Estate, 438 Pa. 22, 263 A.2d 746 (1970).
Collins Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958).
Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89, § 22, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180-22 (1950).
Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, § 16(b), PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 228 (now
Act of 1947, PUION'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14).
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would clearly defeat William's contention because he was adopted
after the date of will. The interpretation of this phrase, therefore,
became an important issue in the proceedings.
Earlier Pennsylvania cases had established a precedent that a court
is limited in the interpretation of a will by the content of the document. 5 This was due to the literal interpretation which the courts had
given to the words in the Wills Act of 1917 stating that "a contrary
intention shall appear by the will." The Court stated in Provident
Trust Company of Philadelphia v. Scott that, "[t]he presumption
created by the Wills Act of June 7, 1917, may be overcome only by
the presence in the will of language clearly indicative of a contrary
dispositive intent or of a form or method of disposition inconsistent
with an exercise of the power. Such contrary intent must appear from
the will, itself, not from extraneous circumstances." 7 The intent of
the testator has always been of primary importance in the interpretation of any will. In Benedum Estate, the court stated that "[t]he testator's intention is the polestar in the construction of every will and
that intention must be ascertained from the language and scheme of
his (entire will) together with the surrounding facts and circumstances;
it is not what the court thinks he might, or would or should have said
in the existing circumstances, or even what the court thinks he meant
to say, but what is the meaning of his words."" It should be noted that
the court had somewhat liberalized its approach by considering the
facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will in its
attempt to discover the testator's intent. Previously, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania stated that, "contrary intent must appear from the
will, itself, not from extraneous circumstances." 9 The court in Jaekel
Estate also stated that the lower court had erred in allowing such
extrinsic evidence to be introduced as an aid in interpreting the written
document.' 0
A similar situation dealing with adopted children had arisen about
ten years prior to Chambers Estate in the decision in Holton Estate."'
In Holton, the supreme court ruled that children adopted after
5. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Scott, 335 Pa. 231, 6 A.2d 814 (1939); Thomson v. Wanamaker's Trustee, 268 Pa. 203, 110 A. 770 (1920).
6. Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, § 16(b), PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 228 (now
Wills Act of 1947, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14).
7. 335 Pa. 231, 6 A.2d 814 (1939).
8. Benedum Estate, 427 Pa. 408, 235 A.2d 129 (1967).
9. Jaekel Estate, 424 Pa. 433, 227 A.2d 851 (1967).

10. Id. at 440, 227 A.2d at 857.

11.
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the death of the testator were not entitled to a trust fund income as
the testator's son's "children." The court could find nothing within
the will itself which stated that the testator intended that his son's
adopted children should be included or excluded from the word children as used in the devise, and therefore could not include these
adopted children without the necessary words. 12 The court would not
rewrite the will to include the word "adopted."
Mister Justice Musmanno's dissent in Holton is noteworthy because
he reached the same conclusion relating to the rights of adopted children as the majority reached in Chambers but for different reasons.
He failed to see the reasons for the distinctions which had been made
by the Pennsylvania courts on the rights of natural children in comparison with those same rights exercised by adopted children. He
states that there is no real difference between the lives lead by adopted
children in comparison with the lives of their natural born comrades.
His dissent is based primarily on public policy reasons. The majority
in Chambers, however, approached the problem of interpretation as
one of understanding the written words of the document itself in the
circumstances in which they were written without using a public policy
argument. Thus, the majority was able to reach a sound public policy
decision without specifically overruling any of its previous decisions.
Because the decision of the court in Holton was contrary to the
majority holding in Chambers, the court managed to distinguish Holton on factual grounds. The fact that it was possible for the testator's
son in Holton to remarry and subsequently to have natural children,
whereas it was impossible for the testator's daughter in Chambers to
have natural children regardless of her marital situation was the major
distinction between the two cases.
In Collins Estate,'3 a will executed in 1912 provided that upon the
death of the children of the testatrix leaving descendants surviving, the
principal of the trust estate was to be paid to such descendants. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the principal would descend
to the two adopted children who survived the daughter of the testatrix,
even though these two children were adopted nine years after the
death of the testatrix. In allowing such disposition, the court found
that the word descendants as used by the testatrix was meant to include
her adopted grandchildren. The court reasoned that at the time of the
12.
13.

Id. at 245, 159 A.2d at 885.
393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958).
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testatrix's death in 1921, the Intestate Act of 1917,14 and the amended
Wills Act of 191715 clearly erased any distinction between the rights
of an adopted child and the rights of a natural child, thus an adopted
child had all of the testamentary rights of a natural child. 16 This was
the state of the law in 1921.
The court also stated that the testatrix "knew that her children
could and actually might adopt children before the event of the taking,"'17 and that there was a sound public policy, historically and socially,
supporting its decision. The court for the first time looked beyond the
written words of the document and used the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will to ascertain the testator's true intent.
This type of rationale, guided by sound public policy reasons, produced an enlightened decision which further extended the rights of
adopted children in Pennsylvania and set the stage for the decision
in the Chambers case.
The Pennsylvania State Supreme Court in Chambers permitted the
use of extrinsic evidence as a guide in ascertaining the testator's intent.
The entire opinion is based on the amount and sufficiency of extrinsic
evidence regarding the testator's knowledge of his daughter's physical
condition. The court permitted admission of evidence that the community at large as well as the testator knew of Hazel G. McGill's incapability to bear natural children. Though the appellee foundation
objected to the evidence on hearsay grounds, the court found no merit
to these objections because the testimony given was merely stating a
matter of common knowledge in the community.'
The court was searching for the testator's intent when he wrote the
word children, a word contained within the four corners of the will.
In this sense, therefore, the court was following previous Pennsylvania
precedent. It was seeking to interpret a word clearly stated within
the will. However, the meaning of the word children, a central issue
in the case, was determined by examining evidence not contained in
the document. The majority, therefore, went beyond the confining
"four comers" doctrine espoused in previous Pennsylvania cases.
14. Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 429, § 16(a), PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 101 (now
Intestate Act of 1947, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.7).
15. Act of June 7, 1917, P.L 403, § 21, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 273 (now
Wills Act of 1947, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7); Act of May 20, 1921, P.L. 937,
§ 1, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 273 (now Wills Act of 1947, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 180.7).
16. 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958).
17. Id. at 211, 142 A.2d at 186.
18. 438 Pa. at 25, 263 A.2d at 748.
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It is clear that the testator could have added the word "adopted"
to the disputed passages of the will after the adoption of Paul or prior
to his death. The fact that he did not do this, is not conclusive proof
that he intended to exclude any disposition of his estate to his adopted
grandchildren, regardless of whether he knew of them or not.
After the adoption of Paul, the testator knew that any additional
children of Hazel would have to be adopted. This knowledge on the
part of the testator was proven by the extrinsic evidence. It is very
likely that the testator intended to include Paul in the devise to the
children of Hazel because of the close relationship between the testator and Paul. This close relationship was also proven by extrinsic
evidence.
Once these facts are established, it is a logical inference that the
testator could not possibly have meant to exclude the adopted William
when he meant to include the adopted Paul. The court draws this
inference as the last step in its step-by-step analysis of the testator's
words and the circumstances under which they were written.
The court in Chambers is giving the word children an expanded
legal definition and is thus opening an entire legal class to adopted
children which heretofore had been closed to them by the Courts of
Pennsylvania. This position is clearly the result of sound public policy
and is thoroughly justified by the status of adopted children today.
In reaching this position, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
greatly extended the scope of its inquiry into the testator's intent; from
the restricting four corners theory to one of almost unlimited proportions. The use of extrinsic evidence in ascertaining the testator's intent,
especially in cases where adopted descendants are involved, will now
be limited only by the court's discretion.
Unless this case can be limited to its rather unique factual situation,
the written words of the testator, where adopted descendants are involved will be interpreted in the light of another's testimony as to
what the testator thought or believed. What this will do to the stability
of the written word as a means of determining dispositive intent remains to be seen. The prudent draftsman, therefore, should make an
effort to be even more specific in order to avoid any questionable testamentary provisions, especially where adopted descendants are involved.
Walter J. Orze
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